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The case of the Scottsboro Nine lives in infamy as one of the most striking and controversial cases concerning inadequacy of legal counsel in the 
history of the United States. Wrongly accused of raping two conniving white 
women in search of revenge, these nine indigent African American men were 
appointed inadequate counsel and subsequently convicted and sentenced to 
death after three rush trials. With poor legal representation and an all white 
jury, they were tried three times in lower courts and received guilty verdicts 
at each stage in their proceedings. It was not until a riot in New York sparked 
the attention of the International Labor Defense and the NAACP that these 
innocent boys were provided with adequate counsel. Yet even with this 
acclaimed legal support, it ultimately took Supreme Court intervention to 
ensure that the principals of the Sixth Amendment’s fair trial guarantees were 
actually preserved.1 In a landmark decision that changed the face of Sixth 
Amendment interpretation in our country, Justice Sutherland claimed: 
Under the circumstances just stated, the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make 
an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due 
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment…in 
a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel 
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense…it is the 
duty of the court to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite 
of due process of law…2
Thirty years later, the Court further expanded the right to indigent defense to 
cover all criminal cases through their opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright. Justice 
Black argued that although Sutherland restricted pro-bono state-provided 
indigent representation to capital cases, such a fundamental right to adequate 
counsel could not be so confined. “From the very beginning,” claimed 
Black, “our state [has] laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive 
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which 
every defendant stands equal before the law.”3 With this enlightening verdict, 
Clarence Earl Gideon and his attorney, Abe Fortas (later an Associate Justice 
on the Supreme Court) secured his acquittal and achieved the expansion of 
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right to pro-bono counsel for all indigent defendants to come. 
 With two such positive verdicts concerning the rights of poor defendants, 
it is easy to presume that the justice system has successfully resolved the issue 
of inadequate counsel and is able to ensure such legal representation in an 
effective way. Unfortunately, the public defense system currently in place 
continues to fail thousands of indigent individuals yearly due to decreased 
funding, a lack of political will to enact fiscal reforms, and unreasonably 
vague guidelines that too easily fall short of sufficiently screening for such 
judicial inadequacy. The case of Strickland v. Washington,4 while attempting 
to better define the parameters determining whether a defendant has received 
inadequate counsel, created a two-pronged test that makes the ruling of 
inadequate representation “outcome determinative.” This alteration reverses 
the burden of proof back to the defendant, forcing them to establish 
innocence where he or she has essentially already been deemed guilty. The 
lack of stringent guidelines and the overly vague nature of the Court’s 
decision is especially troublesome in death penalty cases, where the sentence 
imposed is irrevocable and fundamentally different from other forms of 
punishment. Unreasonably harsh and arbitrarily invoked, capital punishment 
disproportionately affects indigent individuals who lack the economic 
resources that wealthy citizens are able to use in order to gain the best legal 
counsel available. As Justice Ginsberg so accurately remarked, “People who 
are adequately represented at trial do not get the death penalty.”5 With these 
deficiencies in mind, this paper will explore where the Court went wrong in 
the Strickland decision and how such a damaging opinion can be altered to 
fairly ensure adequate counsel for all those represented at trial, especially in 
capital cases. The standards set in Strickland v. Washington fail to properly 
guarantee Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial for individuals who are 
not fortunate enough to be able to secure private representation. Although 
it may be difficult and time consuming to enforce more exacting standards, 
failure to do so denies fundamental constitutional rights to a group of people 
who already lack a political voice to promote the protection of their own 
well being. Policy changes in terms of guidelines and funding for pro-bono 
services must be made in order to adequately reform the system and secure 
fundamental rights for all individuals. 
I. Indigent Counsel and its Inadequacy
Public defenders, while well intentioned, are faced with so many adversities 
in their profession that adequately representing their clients is a virtual 
impossibility. What with lack of funding, an increasingly wealthy opposition, 
massive case overloads, and judicial apathy in terms of appointment of 
counsel, it comes as no surprise that the system is unable to save indigent 
defendants from facing capital punishment unlike those who are able to 
afford private attorneys. A Mississippi Supreme Court Justice made the 
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observation that: 
[He] could take every death sentence case that [the Court has] 
had where [they had] affirmed, give you the facts and not tell 
you the outcome, and then pull an equal number of murder 
cases that have been in our system, give you the facts and not tell 
you the outcome, and challenge you to pick which ones got the 
death sentence and which ones did not, and you couldn’t do it. 
(Bright, Pg. 7)6
This sick game of “Death Penalty roulette” speaks to the fundamental 
unfairness that exists within the justice system in our country, a disequilibrium 
based on the fiscal differences between indigent defendants and wealthy 
government operated defense systems. While District Attorneys’ offices and 
Attorneys General are provided with experienced lawyers, special forensic 
experts, mental health professionals, medical examiners, and professional 
witnesses in order to build their cases,7 public defenders are forced to fight 
tooth and nail to achieve extra funding in order to acquire such professional 
aid. Often they are required to submit extensive documentation of need in 
order to obtain the assistance of these skilled professionals, without which 
they have little chance of convincing presiding judges to rule in their favor. 
Ironically, such documentation is almost impossible to assemble without the 
very professionals the defenders are attempting to obtain. Bright states:
Courts often refuse to authorize funds for investigation and 
experts by requiring an extensive showing of need that fre-
quently cannot be made without the very expert assistance that 
is sought. Many lawyers find it impossible to maneuver around 
this ‘Catch22,’ but even when a court recognizes the right to 
an expert, it often authorizes so little money that no competent 
expert will get involved. (Bright, Pg. 13)
With such an obvious advantage, the government attorneys have an 
exceedingly easy time outshining the defense. As a result, overcoming such 
a stacked deck is almost impossible and denies the defendant their right to a 
fair trial, as such unequal forms of representation clearly skew the results of 
the verdict in favor of the State. 
 Beyond inequalities in the resources available to public defenders, pro-
bono counselors also receive wages falling well below the level needed to 
serve as efficient representation. Depending on the number of hours spent 
investigating and filing briefs on behalf of a specific defendant and on the 
base pay they receive for each case, public defenders may receive just above 
the minimum wage while representing a death penalty case. For instance, 
Alabama provides $20 per hour for outside investigation with a limit of 
$1,000 in total compensation. Under this system, two public defenders that 
represented an indigent defendant spent so much time outside of the case 
investigating on behalf of their client that their wages fell to between $4 
and $5 per hour.8 The same is true in states such as Texas, which allots a 
maximum of $800 for each capital punishment case.9 Considering the rate 
at which Texas convicts and executes death row inmates, this exceedingly 
low compensation is outrageous and easily explains the high conviction rate 
in the state. The lack of sufficient compensation for public defenders deters 
competent attorneys from choosing pro-bono counsel as a career option. 
In addition, because the poor incentive system keeps the number of public 
defenders low, it forces unmanageable caseloads upon lawyers who are 
mostly inexperienced and apathetic towards such an inadequately rewarded 
profession. Although the American Bar Association (ABA) technically sets 
maximum caseloads for public defenders nationwide, the majority of defender 
offices are locally controlled and so overwhelmed by the number of incoming 
suits that they ignore such standards and push more cases onto a dwindling 
number of attorneys. This growing problem has been made worse by the 
recent economic crisis in our country. In fact, major budget cuts have slashed 
already struggling public defender programs, a fact that further exacerbating 
the case load issue while simultaneously diminishing what little compensation 
these attorneys formerly received. 
 The aforementioned budget problems could possibly be ameliorated by 
the addition of private lawyers who are willing to donate a portion of their 
time to pro-bono cases, such as those who are occasionally called upon by 
judges to serve as counsel for indigent defendants at the expense of their own 
firm. However, this system, while theoretically beneficial, is fundamentally 
flawed on many levels. Judges appointing such private attorneys often refrain 
from selecting the most qualified lawyers with the excuse that they have more 
important cases to handle and cannot afford to waste their time on pro-bono 
defense. The attorneys who are chosen are those who are either selected by 
means of nepotism, in order for judges to maintain advantageous connections 
with politicians vital to judicial reelection, or are actively sought out on the 
basis of poor performance.10 Invoking the assistance of attorneys in the latter 
category also bolsters judicial attempts at re-election in terms of conviction 
rates. Since public opinion often supports the death penalty in many states, 
the public is likely to be assuaged when those convicted of atrocious murders 
are seemingly “brought to justice.” Bright states:
Judges either are intentionally appointing lawyers who are not 
equal to the task or are completely inept at securing competent 
counsel in capital cases. The reality is that popularly elected 
judges, confronted by a local community that is outraged over 
the murder of a prominent citizen or angered by the facts of a 
crime, have little incentive to protect the constitutional rights of 
the one accused in such a killing. (Bright, Pg. 24)
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With the aforementioned difficulties apparent in the public defender 
programs as they exist in our country today, it is clear that a more exacting 
standard of adequacy is needed in order to provide some remedy to the 
astounding inequities inherent in this system. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
Strickland test does nothing to combat the aforementioned inequities In fact, 
the decision is so fundamentally flawed in terms of the way the opinion relates 
to the actuality of court appointed counsel that even if it were to provide some 
amelioration, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights would still be violated. 
II. Strickland and its Failures
The case of David Washington does not differ factually from many death 
penalty cases and it presents no obvious distinguishing characteristics that 
would cause it to stand out among capital cases of its kind. Yet Strickland v. 
Washington established a standard of review so lackluster and vague that the 
majority opinion does indeed deserve recognition and review. Washington, 
a frustrated man in financial debt who was overwhelmed by his inability to 
provide for his family, confessed to committing three brutal murders against 
the advice of his court appointed counsel. He waived his right to a jury trial 
and insisted on an en banc hearing after being encouraged by the presiding 
judge’s statement that he had “a great deal of respect for people who [were] 
willing to step forward and admit their responsibility.”11 Feeling helpless and 
unable to prevail considering the circumstances, Washington’s attorney failed 
to call forth witnesses on his client’s behalf, neglected to have him mentally 
examined, and declined to investigate any other mitigating factors concerning 
his emotional state at the time of the murder, all of which may have caused 
the judge to reconsider his decision to rule in favor of capital punishment. 
In the absence of strong mitigating factors, the Judge discovered numerous 
aggravating factors that easily pointed to a death penalty verdict despite his 
former statement of respect for the defendant’s honesty.
 In her majority opinion, Justice O’Conner, a moderate justice with a 
tendency to toe the middle line, established a test in order to determine 
whether counsel would be deemed ineffective. This standard was constructed 
in a way that was so deferential to counsel’s judgment that the Sixth 
Amendment rights of the defendant were easily superseded. Her two-pronged 
approach to review of pro-bono representation states:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so seri-
ous that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as 
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be 
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said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a break-
down in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 
(Strickland, Pg. 466 U.S. 699)12
This two-pronged approach was left intentionally ambiguous so as to 
ensure that professional decisions made in the name of “case strategy” are 
not automatically deemed characteristic of inefficient counsel. An indigent 
defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s action was not based in tactical 
litigation and was instead directly detrimental to the outcome of the case. 
Such a difficult barrier to breach was intended to “reflect the profound 
importance of finality in criminal proceedings.” It was determined that a 
stringent review would prevent excessive rehashing of cases that have already 
been examined and closed, thus eliminating some of the burden on the 
appellate courts. She also states that the vagueness of the standards employed 
are meant to prevent the discouragement of public defenders in taking on such 
difficult cases, as implementing more exacting standards might “dampen the 
ardor” of attorneys who would then be less willing to accept future indigent 
cases. All of these arguments led the Court to decide that Washington was 
provided with adequate counsel and would not be granted review of his case; 
he was executed July 13, 1984 by means of the electric chair. 
 While the facts of David Washington’s claim to ineffective counsel may 
not be particularly strong, the implications of this decision for other indigent 
defendants is frightening, and the ruling severely underestimates the danger 
that ineffective representation truly poses to poor individuals charged with 
capital crimes. Justice O’Connor’s emphasis on the result oriented prejudice 
test perpetuates the “guilty anyhow” syndrome, in which the ends justify the 
means: as long as the defendant is actually guilty of the crime, injustice is said 
to have been avoided by this test. Her standard also assumes that a court or 
judge is able to accurately determine what the result of the verdict would have 
been had effective counsel been offered, an impossibility that clearly distorts 
the test’s accuracy. Finally, Justice O’Connor’s emphasis on the finality of the 
judgment places too much importance on the desire to prevent an increase of 
inefficiency challenges and wrongly denies Sixth Amendment protections to 
those who need it most. 
 According to Richard R. Gabriel,13 O’Connor’s interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment:
Is inadequate because it suggests that the end justifies the means 
in the precise circumstance where the legitimacy of the end is 
dependent on the legitimacy of the means. One who is clearly 
guilty, the Court implies, should not be exonerated because coun-
sel was clearly ineffective. (Gabriel, Pg. 1266)
Although the preservation of law and order is a worthy goal, such an 
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interpretation of the fundamental right to a fair trial goes against the very 
nature of our judicial system. If the process through which a trial is conducted 
is deemed unfair, any verdict stemming from that process must also be said 
to be unjust, regardless of the implications. This devolution of the adversarial 
system appears to fly directly in the face of the cornerstone principle of 
“innocent until proven guilty” and essentially asserts that as long as culpability 
is established, other factors cannot be said to overcome such faults. Gabriel 
identifies this as the “guilty anyhow” syndrome which is heavily supported by 
Justice O’Connor’s statement in Strickland asserting, “If it is easier to dispose 
of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that 
course should be followed.”14 Essentially, Justice O’Connor has ruled that 
if a court finds that the defendant’s verdict would not have reasonably been 
altered by the presence of more efficient counsel, the court is then allowed 
to pass over the first prong of the test and dismiss the defendant’s claim to 
inefficient counsel merely because he would have been guilty anyway. Such 
a sweeping and detrimental statement “allows reviewing courts to excuse acts 
and omissions of counsel with the ‘magic words ‘tactical decision,’ without 
inquiring as to whether the lawyer even thought about the problem.”15 This 
backwards standard pushes the burden of proof back onto the defendant and 
creates an unreasonably high bar that is almost impossible to overcome because 
of the subverting effects of Justice O’Connor’s “prejudice first” attitude. 
Although the desire to reduce review of claims to inefficiency of counsel 
is reasonable, such deference to the “finality” of a verdict unfairly deprives 
indigent defendants of the full protections provided in the Constitution’s 
assurance of a fair trial. As Gabriel rightly asserts, “An unjust conviction 
cannot be upheld solely in the interest of the finality of the proceeding, for 
the ultimate goal of a criminal justice system is to do justice in all cases.”16
III. Possible Solutions 
Failing to protect the right to a fair trial for indigent defendants can 
be characterized as a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution. Effective counsel should not be held to 
such a low standard as the “mirror test” under which an attorney that is 
merely present and breathing is assumed to be capable of providing adequate 
representation. Such a vague and unfair system as the one we have now must 
be altered in order to ensure that the liberties enumerated in our Constitution 
are adequately preserved for all citizens, regardless of their economic standing. 
Equality may come about in one of two ways: either through a reformation of 
the standards concerning inadequate counsel or through a fiscal equalization 
of public defender resources and compensation. Although the creation of 
a more exacting standard of review would require less political effort and 
resources, permanent solutions to the public defender problem will never 
come to fruition unless financial remedies are also put into place. 
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 Attempts should first be made at altering the set of guidelines used to 
determine the efficiency of counsel so as to alter the problem internally 
and evade difficulties in acquiring funds. Instead of Justice O’Connor’s 
two pronged standard, Gabriel suggests a “hybrid test” of review in which 
the defendant is only burdened with the task of proving that his or her 
representation “failed to make decisions that were objectively reasonable” 
considering the circumstances. Unlike Justice O’Connor’s second prejudice 
prong, Gabriel asserts that “once a defendant meets the burden of proof,” 
he or she has successfully proven that counsel was inefficient and should be 
provided with some form of remedy. This reformed standard speaks to the 
fact that fairness in the judicial process is the foremost concern of the courts 
and such justice should not depend on the ultimate outcome of the case. In 
addition to this increased deference to the defendant, it would also be prudent 
to create stricter guidelines in terms of performance of counsel to further 
combat apathetic representation. Courts should only appoint attorneys who 
have had experience in capital cases to work in this area. For example, a set 
number of cases, perhaps two or three, could be used as the benchmark. This 
would ensure that attorneys taking on such difficult cases are not dealing with 
foreign concepts and thereby further disadvantaging their clients. They should 
also be required to spend a minimum number of hours in securing witnesses, 
mental health examinations, and in investigating the personal history of 
their clients before they can be deemed to have sufficiently represented their 
indigent defendant. That being said, these standards would place more strain 
on an already fragile system; requiring prior capital case experience would 
severely limit the number of attorneys judges are able to appoint to indigent 
cases, and hour requirements without increased compensation would result 
in a severe decrease in salary for already underpaid individuals. Thus a 
restructuring of guidelines must necessarily be accompanied by fiscal reforms 
before any true change is able to occur. 
 As stated previously, state DAs and Attorney General offices receive an 
increasing level of resources each year to represent the state in death penalty 
cases. If the government is able to provide such high standards for their 
attorneys, should they not also be required to provide the same extraordinary 
resources to pro-bono attorneys, especially considering public defenders are 
also state funded? The disequilibrium denies equal rights to all citizens and 
unjustly favors the rights of the victims and their families over the rights of 
the defendant. While it is true that the burden of proof lies with the State 
and they must therefore employ more effort in order to demonstrate their 
claim, such inequalities between the two sides clearly indicate that the balance 
is too heavily tipped in their favor in an attempt to more easily villainize the 
defendant. The government should therefore ensure equal resources to public 
defenders and district attorneys such that the right to a fair trial is preserved. 
Increasing the compensation for public defenders will raise incentives to enter 
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this line of work, subsequently reducing caseloads on those attorneys already 
working for public defender offices and allowing counsel to spend more time 
with each client. As a result, they will be able to fully investigate all mitigating 
factors and provide their clients with a fair chance at avoiding the death 
penalty. 
 Some states have attempted to rule on questions of public defender 
funding and have seen relative success in the actual decisions of the court. 
In Louisiana’s State v. Peart,17 the court ruled that the Orleans Indigent 
Defense Program was unconstitutional because of its lack of funding and 
the inability of its attorneys to adequately represent clients due to overwork. 
The trial court ordered the caseload for the specific attorney involved to be 
reduced and suggested long-term funding initiatives to further reform the 
system. Even after the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the opinion 
concerning the unconstitutionality of the system, the State continued to assert 
that indigent defendants were being inadequately represented and ruled that 
the court should adhere to a new standard. Instead of the previous system in 
which courts assumed the effectiveness of government appointed attorneys, 
judges would now automatically assume that poor individuals had suffered 
from inefficient counsel and would require the state to prove otherwise, thus 
reversing the burden of proof once more to the State.18 Similar holdings were 
addressed in State v. Lynch19 in Oklahoma and State v. Smith20 in Arizona, 
both of which initially spurred legislative reform to the public defender system 
and required the State to comply with certain guidelines and levels of funding 
that attempted to equalize the system. Although these three cases provided 
temporary relief, their decisions failed to bring about true reform in these 
states. While the new review system established in Peart demonstrated a step 
forward, the court continued to ignore claims to inadequate counsel, asserting 
that they did not rise to the Peart standard of review. Oklahoma’s fiscal 
reforms provided initial relief to their struggling system but have dwindled 
in recent years due to the economic crisis. These judicial initiatives towards 
reforming the public defender system, while demonstrating the desire to 
equalize both sides of litigation in trials, fail to fully remedy the situation, a 
fact largely due to political apathy and lack of legislative clout. 
 Despite attempts to enact federal legislation concerning public defender 
reform, such efforts have been thwarted by legislators and prosecutors who 
claim that the suggested programs would be too costly and would also intrude 
on our country’s principles of federalism. Bright states:
What is lacking is not money, but the political will to provide 
adequate counsel for the poor in capital and other criminal cases. 
Adequate representation and fairness will never be achieved as 
long as it is accepted that states can pay to prosecute a capital 
case without paying to defend one. Adequate representation and 
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fairness will never be achieved until ensuring justice in the courts 
becomes a priority equal to public concern for roads, bridges, 
schools, police protection, sports, and the arts. (Bright, Pg. 39)
Beneath this guise of “costliness” runs an underlying indication of vehement 
opposition to the idea that these so called “criminals” should receive 
equal justice for the atrocious crimes they committed against innocent 
victims. Legislators, hoping to appear “tough on crime,” are forced to 
renounce personal Sixth Amendment rights in order to appease voters who 
demonstrate strong approval for the death penalty and are encouraged by its 
implementation (regardless of the actual effects of such a verdict). The lack of 
strong political leadership in these initiatives represents a lack of knowledge 
on behalf of the public that supports such an unjust system and apathy on 
the part of legislators who, although supposedly protecting and promoting 
our constitutional rights, are in fact preventing equal justice for thousands of 
indigent individuals. 
 If our government is unable to increase resources and provide equal 
opportunity for justice in the public defender system, the only remaining step 
forward is to abolish the death penalty as a punishment altogether. How can a 
punishment so irrevocable and severe be imposed in the face of such an unjust 
system of representation? As Bright so aptly states:
If a local trial court cannot comply with the most fundamental 
safeguard of the Constitution by providing a capable attorney to 
one whose life is at stake, it should not be authorized to extin-
guish life. The solution is not to depreciate human life and the 
Bill of Rights by accepting what is available. Many small commu-
nities do not have surgeons, yet they do not rely on chiropractors 
to perform heart surgery. (Bright, Pg. 44)
In fact, even if these changes are made, there is no guarantee that they will 
be properly implemented and maintained, as is demonstrated by the failures 
in Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Arizona. The death penalty as a punishment is 
archaic and contradicts our country’s promotion of fundamental human rights. 
Although public opinion may indicate strong support for such a punishment, 
these statistics also reflect a tremendous lack of knowledge concerning indigent 
defense and an inability to fully comprehend the multitude of issues associated 
with our justice system. While the aforementioned solutions will absolutely 
be costly and difficult to implement because of legislative hurdles, price tags 
and political apathy should not be accepted as reasons for the judicial system’s 
failure to equally distribute justice to its citizens. 
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